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The NCAA’s Eligibility Rules Face Antitrust Scrutiny in the Third Circuit

July 8, 2026
Authored by Daniel MacLane

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (the “NCAA”) is a nonprofit organization that has regulated collegiate athletics throughout the United States and Canada for more than a century. In that role, the NCAA promulgates rules governing student-athlete safety, eligibility, recruitment, and competition across dozens of sports and hundreds of thousands of student-athletes.

Given the NCAA’s substantial power and influence over collegiate athletics, its rules have been the subject of extensive litigation. That litigation has intensified since the introduction of Name, Image, and Likeness (“NIL”) compensation in 2021, which allowed college athletes to receive compensation for the commercial use of their name, image, and likeness.

Litigation challenging NCAA rules has been filed across the country and, in some instances, has reached the Supreme Court of the United States. See NCAA v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69 (2021). Disputes involving student-athlete eligibility have also reached New Jersey and the Third Circuit. For example, in 2024, Jeremiah Williams, a guard for the Rutgers University men’s basketball team, brought an action in the District of New Jersey challenging an NCAA suspension arising from an alleged violation of gambling rules. See Williams v. NCAA, No. 3:24-cv-00614-ZNQ-JBD. On February 2, 2024, the District Court granted Williams injunctive relief and immediately reinstated him to the basketball team.

One significant area of NCAA litigation concerns the Sherman Antitrust Act and its application to NCAA rules. On November 25, 2025, the Third Circuit addressed that issue in Elad v. NCAA, 160 F.4th 407 (3d Cir. 2025). In Elad, a Rutgers University football player challenged two NCAA bylaws relating to player eligibility, specifically the effect of Junior College (“JUCO”) participation on a student-athlete’s eligibility to play NCAA football (the “JUCO Rule”). The plaintiff argued that the JUCO Rule “unreasonably restrains the college-football-athlete labor market” in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.

The Third Circuit reviewed a preliminary injunction granted by the District Court, which had allowed the plaintiff to play during the 2025-2026 NCAA football season. The NCAA challenged the District Court’s ruling on two principal grounds:  first, that the Sherman Antitrust Act did not apply because the JUCO Rule was not commercial in nature; and second, that the District Court failed to adequately define the relevant market for purposes of its rule-of-reason analysis.

The Third Circuit rejected the NCAA’s argument that the JUCO Rule was categorically exempt from antitrust scrutiny. The court held that the rule was commercial because it interfered with the plaintiff’s ability to compete in NCAA Division I athletics and profit from that participation. The court further explained that the JUCO Rule limited the plaintiff’s participation in a labor market and that such restraints are subject to review under the Sherman Antitrust Act.

However, the Third Circuit concluded that the District Court failed to properly define the relevant market. In evaluating a claimed violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act under the rule of reason, a court must identify the “relevant market,” or the “area of effective competition.” Because the District Court did not conduct the necessary market analysis, the Third Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

Elad reflects the continued expansion of litigation challenging NCAA rules in the post-Alston and NIL era. It also demonstrates that courts in New Jersey and the Third Circuit are now directly engaging with the antitrust implications of NCAA eligibility rules.

MADISON
TRENTON
NEW YORK CITY

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