What You Need to Know

• Adverse Possession Validity: Cazaubon reinforces that adverse possession is a legitimate basis for pursuing a quiet title action, and a party does not need to hold a deed to the contested property to make a claim.
• Procedural Validity of Claims: This case affirms the procedural validity of complaints filed in adverse possession cases.
• Importance of Procedural Posture: This case highlights the significance of procedural posture, emphasizing the importance of understanding court rules when seeking to dismiss an action.

Introduction

In a recent case from the Third District Appellate Court of Illinois, the Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of a complaint seeking to quiet title through an adverse possession claim, stating that a “quiet title action is the vehicle through which an adverse possession claim can be made.”  Cazaubon v. Blossomgame, 2024 IL App (3d) 230677-U.

Background and Procedural History

Plaintiffs Harold and Barbara Cazaubon (“Plaintiffs”) purchased a residential lot known as 707 S. Riverside, Villa Park, Illinois (“Parcel 707”) in 2021 from Eva Fricke.  Defendants Lorenzo and Stephanie Blossomgame (“Defendants”) purchased the parcel adjacent to Parcel 707 known as 709 S. Riverside (“Parcel 709”) in 2016 from Akhter and Sheema Hussaini (collectively the “Hussainis”).  Plaintiffs’ parcel used an asphalt driveway and a detached garage that was partially located on the south side of the property line. Specifically, “[t]he . . . driveway encroache[d] onto parcel 709 by 2.45 feet to 3.25 feet and the garage intrude[d] by 1.18 feet to 1.97 feet, running west to east along the property line” (the “Disputed Property”).

As such, Plaintiffs filed a quiet title action in 2023 against Defendants “seeking to obtain title to the [D]isputed [P]roperty based on a claim of adverse possession.”  In support of their claim, Plaintiffs alleged that the driveway has existed “for ‘at least 67 years’” and for more than twenty years Plaintiffs and/or their predecessors-in-title have exhibited “continuous, hostile or adverse, actual, open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the” Disputed Property.  Plaintiffs alleged that they “(1) constructed, sealed, and repaired the driveway; (2) constructed, painted, and repaired the garage; (3) removed snow and leaves from the driveway; and (4) used the driveway and garage exclusively, indicating to neighbors that they possessed and claimed ownership of the disputed property.”

In response to Plaintiffs’ quiet title action, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Illinois Code wherein they alleged that Plaintiffs’ complaint did not adequately assert the elements of adverse possession.  To that end, Defendants argued that the Hussainis gave Plaintiffs and Eva Fricke “consent to extend the driveway and the garage onto Parcel 709 and that [P]laintiffs maintained that portion of the driveway and garage with their permission.”  In support of their motion, Defendants submitted their title insurance policy and an estoppel affidavit signed by the Hussainis wherein the Hussainis “averred that they were the ‘Owners’ of parcel 709.”

The trial court held oral argument on Defendants’ motion to dismiss at which time Defendants reiterated that “their permission destroyed the [Plaintiffs’] claim for adverse possession by refuting the element of hostile ownership.”  Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants’ argument could not be raised because Defendants only challenged “the sufficiency of the complaint[]” rather than asserting “an affirmative matter” as is required under section 2-619.  The trial court also rejected Plaintiffs’ contention that they had a claim of right to pursue their quiet title action as “evidence of an assertion of right based on adverse possession supported their quiet title claim.”  In response, the trial court “stated: ‘That’s not legally a claim of right.’”  Ultimately, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and Plaintiffs appealed based on the claim “that dismissal was improper because [Defendants] failed to assert an affirmative matter that defeated their adverse possession claim.”

Decision

The Appellate Court began its analysis with an overview of the elements of adverse possession, finding that Plaintiffs “must prove possession of the disputed property for a period of 20 years and [show their] possession was (1) continuous; (2) hostile; (3) actual; (4) open, notorious, and exclusive; and (5) under a claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.” (citations omitted).  The Court noted that “[a]dverse possession by successive possessors of property who were in privity can be combined to establish continuous possession[]” and reiterated that possession is not deemed hostile if the subject property is used with the owner’s permission.

Next, the Court detailed the procedural requirements of a motion to dismiss under section 2-619(a)(9), noting that “[a] section 2-619(a)(9) motion assumes the allegations in a complaint are true but asserts that the plaintiff's cause of action is barred by ‘other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.’”  The Court went on to define an affirmative matter under section 2-619(a)(9) as “any defense other than a negation of the essential allegations of the plaintiff's cause of action[]” and stated that “[d]ismissal under section 2-619(a)(9) is appropriate only if an affirmative defense negates the plaintiff's claim.”

The Court reviewed the dismissal under section 2-619(a)(9) de novo and held that Defendants’ motion and supporting affidavits failed to set forth an affirmative matter and “merely refuted the well-pleaded allegations in [P]laintiffs’ complaint.”  That is, Plaintiffs alleged that the taking was notorious and hostile as it was done without permission decades before Defendants purchased Parcel 709.  As such, the Court held that dismissal under section 2-619(a)(9) was improper.

Finally, the Court addressed its concern that the trial court “may have believed dismissal was appropriate on the basis that a claimant seeking quiet title must have legal title to the property before he or she can pursue a quiet title claim.” (Emphasis in original).  The Court rebuked any notion that such belief is appropriate as “[i]t is well-settled that title acquired by adverse possession may be used as a basis for an action to quiet title.”  The Court made clear that “[i]n asserting adverse possession, a party seeks a right to title in derogation of the right of the true owner; a deed is not required to support the claim of ownership.”  As such, the Court held that the trial court erred “to the extent the trial court granted [Defendants’] motion to dismiss based on [Plaintiffs] lack of legal title[.]”

Takeaways

This case reiterates that adverse possession is an appropriate vehicle for pursuing a quiet title action.  Indeed, it demonstrates that a party is not required to hold a deed to the contested property prior to making a claim for the same. In short, the case reinforces the procedural validity of complaints filed by litigators in this field every day.  Further, this case serves as a reminder that procedural posture matters and when seeking to dismiss an action it is critical to understand the requirements of the applicable court rule.