Washington Appellate Court Affirms Dismissal of Homeowner’s Prescriptive Easement and Nuisance Claims Regarding Septic Drainfield System Banner Image

Washington Appellate Court Affirms Dismissal of Homeowner’s Prescriptive Easement and Nuisance Claims Regarding Septic Drainfield System

Washington Appellate Court Affirms Dismissal of Homeowner’s Prescriptive Easement and Nuisance Claims Regarding Septic Drainfield System

The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two, recently affirmed the dismissal of a homeowner’s prescriptive easement and nuisance claims, finding instead that there was an implied easement that allowed both the homeowner and an adjoining property owner to share use of a septic drainfield system.  See Conklin v Bentz, 2021 WL 2229818 (Wash. Ct. App. June 2, 2021).  In the case, adjoining property owners purchased their respective properties from the same owner. The properties shared the same septic drainfield system that was installed by the prior owners and located on the defendant’s property.  Pursuant to a “Drainfield Easement Agreement” recorded by the prior owners in 2001, the drainfield was placed on the defendant’s lot, but the easement was over three properties, including the plaintiff’s.  The agreement also provided that there was a “non-exclusive perpetual easement” across the three properties.  In 2013, a blockage in the drainfield caused severe damage to the defendant’s property.  Although the plaintiff’s property sustained no damage, the plaintiff demanded that the defendant disconnect her property from the drainfield. After the defendant refused, the plaintiff brought an action for: (1) quiet title and exclusive access and use of the drainfield; (2) nuisance and trespass; (3) a prescriptive easement; and (4) a declaration that the plaintiff had exclusive use of the drainage system.  The defendant counterclaimed for adverse possession to all land and improvements on her side of the fence between the properties and challenged the plaintiff’s use of the septic system.  The trial court, finding that the drainfield was necessary to the use of the parties’ respective properties and that the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his property had not been in any way affected by the shared drainfield system, dismissed the plaintiff’s prescriptive easement and nuisance claims, denied the plaintiff’s requested injunctive relief, and found an implied easement based on prior use.  The trial court also granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the adverse possession claim.  Lastly, the trial court awarded attorney’s fees to the defendant “as the prevailing party on both the adverse possession and prescriptive easement claims.”

On appeal, the Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on the merits, but remanded with regard to the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees.  First, the Court found that the trial court’s finding of an implied easement did not circumvent a valid written, express easement.  Here, the Drainfield Easement Agreement listed the previous owners as both the grantors and grantees.  Moreover, the agreement was recorded while the previous owners owned all three properties.  As a result, no valid written, express easement was created, allowing for the Court's finding of an implied easement.  In so finding, the Court noted that “[a] person cannot have the same rights twice in the form of ownership interest and a separate possessory interest through an easement.”  Next, the Court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing the plaintiff’s nuisance claim because the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant’s connection to the drainfield substantially and unreasonably interfered with his ability to use and enjoy his property.  Lastly, the Court found that the trial court properly awarded the defendant attorney’s fees for her adverse possession claim.  However, because the defendant was not entitled to attorney’s fees for defending the plaintiff’s prescriptive easement claim and the trial court made no findings regarding how it determined the amount of fees awarded, the Court remanded for entry of findings regarding the number of hours spent on the adverse possession claim, reasonableness of the time spent, and what fees it found were equitable and just.

For a copy of the decision, please contact Michael O’Donnell at modonnell@riker.com, Desiree McDonald at dmcdonald@riker.com, or Kevin Hakansson at khakansson@riker.com.

Fifth Circuit Holds Individual Guarantor Waived His Right to Challenge Guaranty in Forbearance Agreements

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently rejected an individual guarantor’s (“Lockwood”) fraudulent inducement and duress claims and held that the guaranty he entered was enforceable and that he waived any defenses to the same in subsequent forbearance agreements. See Lockwood Int’l, Inc. v. Wells Fargo, Nat’l Ass’n,, 2021 WL 3624748 (5th Cir. Aug. 16, 2021).  In 2015, some of Lockwood’s companies had entered into revolving credit notes totaling $90 million.  After the borrowers breached some of their obligations in 2016, the lenders restructured the deals and Lockwood provided a personal guaranty.  After further defaults, Lockwood and the borrowers entered into a forbearance agreement where he acknowledged his obligations on the loans and waived all defenses.  After even more defaults, they entered a second forbearance, again acknowledging the obligations and waiving defenses.  Finally, after more defaults, the lenders accelerated and this lawsuit followed.  The lenders moved for summary judgment on the guaranty, and Lockwood opposed, arguing defenses of fraudulent inducement, duress, unclean hands, and equitable estoppel.  The District Court granted the lenders’ motion, ordering Lockwood to pay $58,710,456.26, plus interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs.

On appeal, the Court affirmed.  It first held that “[t]o avoid enforcement of the guaranty, Lockwood needs a hat trick: He must show that the guaranty, the first forbearance agreement, and the second forbearance agreement are all voidable.”  The Court then found that “[e]ven if the guaranty itself is voidable—something we doubt but need not resolve—the first forbearance agreement ratified its terms.”  Despite Lockwood’s claims, the Court found that the lenders did not fraudulently induce Lockwood into executing the forbearance, because he was aware of all material terms ahead of executing it.  Additionally, the Court rejected Lockwood’s claims of duress:  “No doubt Lockwood feared the looming prospect of the banks’ demanding the tens of millions of dollars that he and his companies owed. The banks used that leverage to seek something they wanted . . . But using leverage is what negotiation is all about. And difficult economic circumstances do not alone give rise to duress.  If they did, then many loans would be voidable.”  Accordingly, the Court found the guaranty was enforceable against Lockwood.

For a copy of the decision, please contact Michael O’Donnell at modonnell@riker.com, Desiree McDonald at dmcdonald@riker.com, or Kevin Hakansson at khakansson@riker.com.

NJ Takes Steps to Regulate Environmental Impacts of Cannabis

While entrepreneurs and investors rush to set up cannabis businesses throughout the Garden State, how will New Jersey regulate the environmental impacts of the industry?

As we discussed in our previous post — NJ Cannabis Industry to Focus on Environmental Considerations — most people fail to recognize the environmental impact of cannabis.  In addition to being energy intensive, producing cannabis results in numerous issues related to water, air quality, and waste management.

While the New Jersey Cannabis Regulatory Commission ("CRC") now has adopted regulations relating to environmental impact and sustainability, many questions remain.  (These regulations will be in effect for up to one year, and will empower the CRC to begin licensing cannabis businesses.)

Applicants and existing businesses alike should consult with appropriate professionals to understand and minimize environmental impacts — especially prospective businesses that will be participating in the competitive licensing process.

Environmental Impact and Sustainability Plans

In order to operate a cannabis business in New Jersey, businesses need to obtain one of the coveted licenses through the competitive licensing process.  As part of the process, prospective cannabis businesses must prepare and submit an environmental impact plan.  The environmental impact plan is evaluated and scored, and can impact whether an applicant receives one of the licenses.

Before the new regulations, there was very little information about the proper components of an environmental impact plan for cannabis businesses in New Jersey, primarily for two reasons:

  1. The adult-use cannabis law does not provide details regarding the components of environmental impact plans; and
  2. Environmental impact plans previously submitted to the New Jersey Department of Health under New Jersey’s Medical Marijuana Program have not been made public.

Fortunately, the new regulations provide some information regarding the appropriate elements of an environmental impact plan.  Interestingly, the environmental impact plan requirements for a temporary license differ from those relating to standard licenses:

  1. Temporary license — Applicants seeking a temporary cannabis license are only directed to submit “an environmental impact plan, which includes consideration of sustainable alternatives to single-use plastic packaging.”
  2. Standard license — Applicants seeking a standard license are directed to submit “an environmental impact plan, which shall, at a minimum, include consideration of sustainable alternatives to single-use plastic packaging, efforts to minimize water usage, and any other factor required by the [CRC] . . . .”

The focus on single-use plastic packaging is consistent with New Jersey’s overall goal of reducing plastic waste in the Garden State (sustainable packaging alternatives might include reusable or refillable packaging, but this presents additional issues).

The new regulations also require cannabis businesses to create and implement environmental sustainability plans as a condition of receiving a license, which may include, but are not limited to:

  1. A waste reduction plan;
  2. A water usage reduction plan;
  3. Biodynamic farming;
  4. A sustainable packaging plan which reduces or eliminates the use of single-use plastics and promotes the use of recyclable or green packaging; or
  5. A plan to use some amount of renewable energy to power its operations.

Unfortunately, these provisions omit many relevant considerations, such as air emissions, climate change, and environmental justice. Given the anticipated competitiveness of the cannabis application process, prospective applicants should be as rigorous and comprehensive as possible in addressing environmental impacts.  Further, it may be in the best interests of applicants to consider underlying environmental impacts. For instance, by focusing on soil health rather than biodynamic farming, applicants can show that they are getting to the heart of the problem.

To better understand environmental impacts and concerns, cannabis license applicants should refer to the National Cannabis Industry Association (NCIA), which issued a report in October 2020 titled Environmental Sustainability in the Cannabis Industry: Impacts Best Management Practices and Policy Considerations.

Essentially, cannabis businesses looking to operate in New Jersey should focus on environmental considerations early in the planning process, bringing together architects, engineers, and environmental professionals to identify and minimize environmental impacts.

Waste Disposal

One of the most important environmental impacts that other states have wrangled with is cannabis waste disposal. In fact according to the NCIA, “The environmental impact from the volume of cannabis byproducts currently estimated to be landfilled is equivalent to the emissions from more than 6,000 passenger vehicles’ or more per year.”

As discussed in detail in our prior post referenced above, the New Jersey Department of Health prescribed certain disposal and composting practices, and specifically allowed certain marijuana waste to be composted.  However, much more needs to be done to reduce the environmental impact of cannabis waste.  Unfortunately, the new regulations do not provide any additional information on acceptable cannabis waste disposal or recycling practices.  As a result, it is unclear whether the prior policies will remain in place, or whether the CRC will issue further guidelines regarding the disposal of cannabis waste.

Hopefully, moving forward the CRC will embrace more environmentally friendly regulatory alternatives, including by increasing the types of wastes that can be composted and eliminating or reducing the requirement to mix cannabis refuse with other wastes.

Conclusion

The Garden State is about to get a lot greener. While many see lucrative business opportunities on the horizon, few entrepreneurs are aware of the environmental impacts. Left unconsidered, these impacts can impede an applicant’s ability to obtain a cannabis license in New Jersey. Our attorneys continue to follow these issues closely, and businesses should prepare to address environmental impacts early in the business development process.

See also Riker Danzig’s recent Alert, “Main Street Gets the Green Light,” which provides insights on the Cannabis Regulatory Commission’s first set of rules to regulate adult-use cannabis in the Garden State.

For more information, please contact any attorney in our Environmental Practice Group.

Proposed and Final Federal Payment Rules

For more information about this blog post, please contact Khaled J. KleleRyan M. MageeLabinot Alexander Berlajolli, or Connor Breza.

CMS Releases Proposed Payment Rules

86 FR 35874: Under the 2022 Home Health Prospective Payment System proposed rule, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) would increase payments to home health agencies by 1.8 percent, which CMS estimates to be $330 million.  However, CMS noted that home health agencies may see an aggregate 0.1 percent, or $20 million, decrease in payments due to the reductions made in the rural add­‑on payment.  CMS also proposed a nationwide expansion of the Home Health Value‑Based Purchasing model, which was originally implemented in nine states on January 1, 2016.

The proposed rule also would make permanent some of the home health conditions of participation implemented during the COVID‑19 pandemic, including the 14‑day on‑site supervisory requirement when a patient is receiving skilled nursing services.  Comments are due by August 27, 2021.

86 FR 36322: Under the 2022 End‑Stage Renal Disease (“ESRD”) Prospective Payment System proposed rule, CMS would increase the current base rate for ESRD by $2.42 to $255.55 for 2022.  CMS also proposed lifting the payment rate for renal dialysis services for individuals with acute kidney injury to $255.55.  The new rule would update the outlier services’ fixed‑dollar loss amounts for 2022 using 2020 data, such that for pediatric beneficiaries, the fixed‑dollar loss amount would decrease from $44.78 to $30.38, and the Medicare allowable payment amount would decrease from $30.88 to $28.73; for adult beneficiaries, the fixed‑dollar loss amount would decrease from $122.49 to $111.18, and the Medicare allowable payment would decrease from $50.92 to $47.87.

Due to the significant impact of COVID‑19, CMS proposed to modify scoring and payment methodologies to ensure that no facility will receive a payment reduction in 2022.  Additionally, the rule would extend the remaining deadlines for ESRD providers and facilities to submit September through December 2020 ESRD quality incentive program data until September 1, 2021.  Comments are due by August 31, 2021.

86 FR 39104: Under the 2022 Physician Fee Schedule proposed rule, the conversion factor for 2022 is $33.58, decreased from $34.89 in 2021.  CMS also suggested defining a “physician‑owned distributor” as a medical device manufacturer or applicable group purchasing organization, where physicians or a physician’s immediate family members have at least 5 percent ownership or receive compensation in the form of a commission, return on investment, profit‑sharing, profit distribution, or other remuneration directly or indirectly based on sale or distribution of devices.  The new definition would only be for open payments reporting, and it would not apply to the Anti‑Kickback Statute or its safe harbors.  Comments are due by September 13, 2021.

CMS Finalizes 5 Payment Rules

CMS has released final payment rules for inpatient facilities, skilled nursing facilities, hospices, inpatient psychiatric facilities, and inpatient rehabilitation facilities.  The final rules are effective October 1, 2021.

Inpatient Facilities

86 FR 44774: Under the Inpatient Prospective Payment System (“IPPS”) final rule, CMS estimates that, overall, hospitals that report quality data and are meaningful users of electronic health records (“EHRs”) will see a 2.5 percent increase in Medicare rates for 2022.  CMS expects that hospital payments will increase by an aggregate $2.3 billion.  An add‑on payment for COVID‑19 treatment through the end of the fiscal year in which the public health emergency ends also was finalized under the rule.

Additionally, CMS has added five new measures to the Inpatient Quality Reporting Program, including COVID‑19 vaccination rates among healthcare personnel and a maternal morbidity structural measure.  CMS also finalized changes to the interoperability program to reduce the burden on eligible hospitals and critical access hospitals, including an increase to the minimum required score for the objectives and measures from 50 to 60 points (out of 100 points) to be considered a meaningful EHR user.

Skilled Nursing Facilities

86 FR 42424: The final rule increases payments to skilled nursing facilities (“SNFs”) by 1.2 percent in 2022.  CMS estimates that the overall economic impact will be a $410 million increase in Medicare Part A payments to SNFs in 2022.  Additionally, the final rule requires SNFs to report the COVID‑19 vaccination status of their employees to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National healthcare Safety Network on a weekly basis.

Hospices

86 FR 42528: Under the final rule, hospices will see a 2 percent increase in payments for 2022, which CMS estimates to be $480 million, as well as an increase to the cap that limits the amount of payments a hospice receives per patient annually to $31,297.61.  CMS also will implement a new measure for the Hospice Quality Reporting Program called the Hospice Care Index, which has 10 indicators of quality that are calculated from the claims data.  Moreover, the final rule makes permanent several waivers issued during the COVID‑19 pandemic, including a waiver that allowed the use of pseudo‑patients for hospice aide competency testing.

Inpatient Psychiatric Facilities

86 FR 42608: The final rule increases the payment rate for inpatient psychiatric facilities (“IPFs”) by 2 percent in 2022.  CMS estimates that the overall economic impact will be an $80 million increase in payments to IPFs.  Moreover, CMS finalized a policy to ensure that medical residents will not be displaced if their teaching hospital or program closes, preventing them from getting board‑certified.  IPFs will also be required to report the COVID‑19 vaccination status of their employees to the CDC NHSN.

Inpatient Rehabilitation Facilities

86 FR 42362: Under the final rule, there will be a net increase to the payment rate for inpatient rehabilitation facilities (“IRFs”) of 1.5 percent in 2022.  The net increase includes the IRF market basket increase factor of 1.9 percent, less a 0.4 percent decrease in estimated IRF outlier payments.  CMS estimates that the overall payments to IRFs will increase by $130 million in 2022.  Like SNFs and IPFs, IRFs are also required to report the COVID‑19 vaccination status of their employees.

California Appellate Court Affirms Order Granting Anti-SLAPP Motion in Quiet Title Action

The Court of Appeal of California, Third Appellate District, recently affirmed a trial court’s decision striking claims for quiet title and declaratory relief under California's anti-SLAPP statute, finding that recording a judgment constitutes a protected activity which is privileged under Civil Code § 47(b)(2). See Reynolds v. Palmbaum, 2021 WL 3184943 (Cal. Ct. App. July 28, 2021).  The plaintiffs, a husband and wife, purchased a home with each owning a one-half interest as their separate property pursuant to a prenuptial agreement. In 2017, the husband recorded a $900,000 deed of trust in favor of the wife. Two days later, a judgment in favor of the defendants in the amount of $558,190.93 was entered against the husband and his law firm and subsequently recorded in the Sacramento Recorder’s Office. When plaintiffs later decided to sell their home, no title insurance company would insure title because of the recorded abstract of judgment, and no buyer would purchase the home without title insurance. After the defendants refused to remove the abstract of judgment to allow the sale, the plaintiffs brought a claim for quiet title, declaratory relief and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The defendants moved to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16, arguing that “[d]efendants’ alleged conduct, i.e., the recording of an abstract of judgment and the creation of a judicial lien thereby, constitutes protected activity which is absolutely privileged pursuant to Civil Code §47(b)(2).”  The trial court agreed and dismissed the action.

On appeal, the Court affirmed. First, it found that the defendants established that the claims for quiet title and declaratory relief arose from the protected activity of filing a judgment lien. Specifically, the quiet title claim sought the removal of the judgment lien and the declaratory relief claim sought a determination of the lien’s applicability to the wife and its priority over the deed of trust. Next, the Court found that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the litigation privilege. The Court noted that, like the case at bar, this privilege has been held to apply to the recording of an abstract of judgment with a county recorder’s office. Moreover, the Court noted that while plaintiffs styled their suit as simply determining lien priority and the validity of a deed of trust, the context made clear that the objective was to negate the effect of the recording of the judgment. Specifically, plaintiffs sent a demand letter which conditioned avoiding suit on the lien’s removal. Given the foregoing, the Court affirmed the trial court’s order granting the defendants’ motion to strike the complaint.

For a copy of the decision, please contact Michael O’Donnell at modonnell@riker.com, Desiree McDonald at dmcdonald@riker.com, or Kevin Hakansson at khakansson@riker.com.

Federal Regulation Update: CMS Seeks to Yank Most Favored Nation Model

For more information about this blog post, please contact Khaled J. KleleRyan M. Magee, or Labinot Alexander Berlajolli.

86 FR 43618: This proposed rule rescinds the Most Favored Nation (“MFN”) Model – a drug pricing model that matches payments for Medicare Part B drugs and biologicals to the lowest price paid by other comparable countries. The MFN was intended as an innovative way to lower prescription drug costs, reduce Medicare reimbursement rates to healthcare facilities, and open negotiations to discounts with drug manufacturers.

Instead, however, as we covered in previous blog posts, several federal district courts intervened to temporarily prevent the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) from implementing the MFN, originally scheduled to begin January 1, 2021. On December 23, 2020, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland issued a nationwide temporary restraining order, enjoining CMS’s implementation of the rule. In a related case, just days later on December 28, 2020, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California followed suit. Two more days later, on December 30, 2020, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York also issued its own injunction, enjoining implementation of the rule specifically as it pertains to EYLEA®.  The underlying lawsuits allege, among other things, that CMS violated the dictates of the APA rulemaking process, the MFN exceeds statutory authority, and the MFN raises issues of constitutionality.

CMS is supposedly exploring new opportunities to address the high cost of Medicare Part B drugs and Medicare reimbursement spending. Comments to this proposed rule are due by October 12, 2021.

86 FR 35615: This final rule finalizes the methodology and data sources necessary to determine federal payment amounts to be made for program year 2022 to states that elect to establish a Basic Health Program (“BHP”) under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. A BHP is another option for states to provide affordable health benefits to lower income individuals who satisfy certain income criteria. In states that elect to operate a BHP, the BHP will make affordable health benefits coverage available for individuals under age 65 with household incomes between 133 percent and 200 percent of the federal poverty level (“FPL”) who are not otherwise eligible for Medicaid, the Children's Health Insurance Program (“CHIP”), or affordable employer-sponsored coverage, or for individuals whose income is below these levels but are lawfully present non-citizens ineligible for Medicaid.

86 FR 41803: This proposed rule would reinterpret the scope of the general requirement that State payments for Medicaid services under a State plan must be made directly to the individual practitioner providing services, in the case of a class of practitioners for which the Medicaid program is the primary source of revenue. Specifically, this proposal, if finalized, would explicitly authorize states to make payments to third parties to benefit individual practitioners by ensuring health and welfare benefits, training, and other benefits customary for employees, if the practitioner consents to such payments to third parties on the practitioner's behalf. Comments are due by September 28, 2021.

Illinois Federal Court Grants Title Insurer’s Motion to Dismiss Breach of Contract and Consumer Fraud Claims

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently granted a title insurance company’s motion to dismiss claims for breach of contract and consumer fraud, finding that the plaintiff failed to allege any loss and that his claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act was barred by the statute of limitations. See Steward v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., et. al., 2021 WL 3142042 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2021).  In 2007, the plaintiff purchased a home using a mortgage obtained from Washington Mutual Bank (“Washington Mutual”) and obtained an owner’s title insurance policy.  The plaintiff purchased the home from the guardian of the Estate of Eddie Griffin (“Griffin”). In 2019, however, the plaintiff learned that thirty-three years before he purchased the home, title to the property had been placed in an express trust by Griffin. That same day, a deed transferred title to the property from Griffin to Cosmopolitan National Bank of Chicago as Trustee under the provisions of a Trust Agreement dated June 20, 1974. Thus, when the plaintiff purchased the property, the transfer was defective. Accordingly, in 2019, the plaintiff filed a claim with the title company, who denied the claim. In the meantime, Washington Mutual sold the note securing the plaintiff’s mortgage to Freddie Mac. However, the plaintiff believed Chase owned the mortgage as receiver of Washington Mutual’s assets, and Chase refinanced his mortgage in 2011. The plaintiff brought a claim for breach of contract and fraud under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, alleging that the title company improperly denied his claim and failed to disclose that the mortgage was owned by Freddie Mac to coerce the plaintiff into purchasing title insurance he did not need.

The Court granted the title company’s motion to dismiss. First, the Court found that there was no breach of contract because the plaintiff failed to assert a loss. According to terms of the title insurance policy, the title company was not required to provide coverage unless the plaintiff suffered a loss.  The Court noted that if Griffin’s trust or its beneficiaries demanded title to the home, the plaintiff would likely have a claim. However, no demand was made, and no demand could be made since it would be barred by the seven-year Illinois adverse possession statute. Next, the Court found that the plaintiff’s claim that the title company violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act claim because it knew or should have known that the 2011 refinance of his mortgage was a fraud was foreclosed by the statute of limitations. In so finding, the Court denied the plaintiff’s argument that his injury did not accrue until the title company denied his title claim. Assuming the title company was involved in the plaintiff’s 2011 refinance, the three-year statute of limitations ran in 2014. Accordingly, the Court granted the title company’s motion to dismiss.

For a copy of the decision, please contact Michael O’Donnell at modonnell@riker.com or Desiree McDonald at dmcdonald@riker.com.

Recent New Jersey Rule Adoptions

For more information about this blog post, please contact Khaled J. KleleRyan M. Magee, or Labinot Alexander Berlajolli.

Adopted Telemedicine Rules

The below rules were adopted to establish the standards for providing services through telemedicine and telehealth for the following licensees:

  • 53 N.J.R. 1283(a): licensees of the State Board of Marriage and Family Therapy Examiners
  • 53 N.J.R. 1285(a): licensees of the Professional Counselor Committee of the State Board of Marriage and Family Therapy Examiners
  • 53 N.J.R. 1288(a): physician assistants licensed by the State Board of Medical Examiners (the “BME”)
  • 53 N.J.R. 1290(a): electrologists licensed by the Electrologists Advisory Committee and the BME

The New Jersey Nurse Licensure Compact

53 N.J.R. 936(b): In 2019, New Jersey entered the Nurse Licensure Compact. The Compact is an agreement between states in which nurses licensed in one member state ("home state") may work in another member state ("remote state") without obtaining a license in the remote state. To effectuate the Compact, the Board of Nursing adopted new rules to establish the procedures for applying for licenses with multistate privileges.

Hospices and Unused Medications

53 N.J.R. 700(b): This adopted rule establishes standards to which a hospice must adhere to in the event it elects to accept and dispose of surrendered prescription medications of its patients.  For example, the hospice must establish detailed written procedures that identifyies and limits which licensed professional may accept the surrendered prescription medications.

American Society for Radiation Oncology

53 N.J.R. 703(a): This adopted rule adds the American Society for Radiation Oncology (“ASTRO”) as a recognized accrediting body from which ambulatory care facilities and hospitals can obtain the mandatory accreditation of their radiation oncology programs and services.

Pharmacology and APNs

53 N.J.R. 937(a): This adopted rule requires an applicant for certification as an advanced practice nurse to complete six hours in pharmacology related to controlled dangerous substances, including education in pharmacologic therapy, addiction prevention and management, and issues concerning opioid drugs.

Reimbursement Codes for Podiatry

53 N.J.R. 1001(b): This adopted rule updates the reimbursement code information for podiatry services, such that the healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (“HCPCS”) procedure codes reflect the current codes authorized by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) and the reimbursement amounts provided by the Medicaid/NJ FamilyCare fee‑for‑service program.

Changes to Standards for Developmental Disabilities

53 N.J.R. 1145(b): This adopted rule sets forth the family maintenance standard, medical cost standard, tuition deduction standard, and the cost of care and maintenance rates that shall be used in the determination of eligibility and the contribution to care and maintenance of individuals residentially placed by the Division of Developmental Disabilities and their legally responsible relatives for the period beginning January 1, 2021.

New York Federal Court Finds Notation of Loan Suspension on Credit Report Insufficient to Demonstrate Concrete Injury under FCRA

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently dismissed a consumer’s claim under § 1681e(b) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the “FCRA”), finding that the notation of a loan suspension on the consumer’s credit report and the resulting diminution in his credit score were insufficient, standing alone, to demonstrate a concrete reputational or financial injury. See Grauman v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 2021 WL 3239865 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 2021). In the case, the plaintiff’s mortgage payments were suspended from April 15 to July 1, 2020 as a form of emergency COVID-19 relief offered by the plaintiff’s lender. Despite the suspension, the plaintiff continued to make his monthly mortgage payments on time. However, the plaintiff’s credit report from Equifax reflected a 16-point drop in his credit score, which the plaintiff attributed to what he believed to be the mortgage lender’s improper reporting of his mortgage payment suspension. The following month, the plaintiff’s credit report stated that a remark by the plaintiff’s mortgage lender had been removed from his account, although his credit score was not restored to its prior higher level. The plaintiff then brought a putative class action under § 1681e(b) of the FCRA against Equifax and VantageScore (the “Defendants”), a company co-owned by Equifax that provides an algorithm used to generate consumers’ credit scores, alleging that the reporting of plaintiff’s mortgage loan suspension and his resulting credit score drop constituted a negligent and willful violation of FCRA’s requirement that credit reporting agencies employ reasonable procedures to ensure the accuracy of consumer reports. The Defendants moved to dismiss.

The District Court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the FCRA claim. First, the Court noted that to establish standing, the plaintiff was required to prove by a preponderance that: (1) he has suffered an “injury in fact,” that is “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;” (2) “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of”; and (3) it is “likely . . . that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Although the Court acknowledged that Congress has statutorily conferred legal interests on consumers under the FCRA, the Court found that the plaintiff failed to allege concrete and particularized injury to that interest. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021), the Court found that the notation of the plaintiff’s loan suspension on his credit report and the diminution in his credit score were insufficient, standing alone, to demonstrate concrete reputational or financial injury. Specifically, the inaccurate credit reports were never disseminated to a third party and plaintiff did not allege that he tried or was imminently planning to use his credit report to procure credit. Finally, the Court found that the plaintiff failed to allege a risk of future harm. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the complaint.

For a copy of the decision, please contact Michael O’Donnell at modonnell@riker.com or Desiree McDonald at dmcdonald@riker.com.

Hawaii Federal Court Dismisses RESPA and TILA Claims as Untimely

The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii recently dismissed claims brought by a homeowner under the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), finding that they were outside the relevant limitations periods. See Mathias v. HomeStreet Bank, Inc., 2021 WL 2534557 (D. Haw. June 21, 2021).  In the case, plaintiff refinanced his residential mortgage on March 1, 2018.  According to plaintiff, defendants failed to provide certain mandatory disclosures to him, including regarding the right to rescind, in violation of RESPA and TILA, among other issues.  On March 22, 2021, plaintiff filed this action seeking to rescind the loan under TILA and seeking statutory damages under RESPA and TILA.  The defendants moved to dismiss.

The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.  First, the Court dismissed the rescission claim.  Under TILA, a consumer has the right to rescind within three business days if the consumer was provided with all necessary disclosures, and three years if the consumer was not.  In this case, the Court found that even if plaintiff did not receive the disclosures, more than three years had passed and the claim therefore is time barred.  In doing so, the Court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the three-year period began to run on April 18, 2018, when plaintiff received a "revised Closing disclosure."  The Court found that, unlike section 1635(a) of TILA, which says that certain time periods begin to run "when the loan has been consummated or upon receipt of 'material disclosures,' 'whichever is later,'" section 1635(f) holds that the three-year period begins on "the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of the property, whichever occurs first."  Thus, the March 1, 2018 refinance date applied here, regardless of if defendants provided disclosures in April.  Second, the Court found that the damages claims were also time barred.  There is a one-year limitations period for statutory damages under both TILA (15 U.S.C. § 1640) and RESPA (12 U.S.C. § 2614), and plaintiff brought this action well outside that period.  Although the Court acknowledges that some claims may be equitably tolled, it found that plaintiff did not allege that here.  Accordingly, the Court dismissed the complaint.

For a copy of the decision, please contact Michael O’Donnell at modonnell@riker.com or Desiree McDonald at dmcdonald@riker.com.

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