5-Year Failure to Provide Title Claim Notice Relieves Underwriter of Duty to Defend Banner Image

5-Year Failure to Provide Title Claim Notice Relieves Underwriter of Duty to Defend

5-Year Failure to Provide Title Claim Notice Relieves Underwriter of Duty to Defend

Introduction

In a recent case from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, the Court examined whether the duty to defend is triggered when a lender fails to provide the title insurance company notice of a complaint seeking to extinguish its deed of trust for more than five years after the suit was brought and after the lender settled the matter.  The duty was not triggered and the lender was not entitled to coverage as it settled the action without giving the underwriter notice of the action.  See U.S Bank N.A. v. Fidelity National Tilte Inc. Co., 2024 WL 125416 (D. Nev.  2024).

Background

In 2005, Milagros and Elpido Raon (the “Raons”) acquired real property in Las Vegas, Nevada, with financing provided by Liberty American Corp. The property is governed by the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions of the Eldorado Neighborhood Second Homeowners Association (“HOA”). Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs establishes that the obligation to pay assessments runs with the land, constituting a perpetual lien on the property. Consequently, by acquiring the property, the Raons committed to paying annual HOA assessments.

To finance the purchase, the Raons obtained a loan for $233,750 from Liberty American Corporation (“Liberty”) and executed a deed of trust (the “DOT”), granting a security interest in the property. Liberty later assigned the DOT to U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”). Fidelity National Title Insurance Company (“FNTIC”) issued a lender’s title insurance policy (the “Policy”), to insure the priority of the DOT over competing liens, including those of the HOA.

Around 2011, the Raons ceased paying monthly HOA assessments. On December 2, 2013, the HOA foreclosed on the property and sold it to Samsara Investments LLC Series #3 (“Samsara”) for $9,700.00 via a non-judicial foreclosure (“HOA Sale”). On August 14, 2015, U.S. Bank submitted a claim under the Policy to FNTIC, seeking coverage for losses arising from the HOA Sale. On October 9, 2014, FNTIC informed U.S. Bank of its decision to deny coverage. U.S. Bank subsequently requested reconsideration, but FNTIC issued a second denial on February 5, 2014. The Opinion does not set forth the grounds for the denial.

On December 8, 2015, Samsara filed a lawsuit against U.S. Bank, seeking a declaration that the DOT had been extinguished by the HOA Sale. U.S. Bank settled with Samsara without notifying FNTIC of the lawsuit, reconveying its interest under the Deed of Trust. On October 8, 2020, U.S. Bank initiated the present action against FNTIC, asserting five distinct causes of action. FNTIC now moves to dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

The Decision

FNTIC maintained that U.S. Bank's claims for declaratory judgment and breach of contract fail because U.S. Bank settled the Samsara lawsuit without notifying FNTIC, violating Condition 8(c) of the Policy. Condition 8(c) states that the insurer is not liable for any loss or damage if the insured settles a claim without prior written consent. U.S. Bank contended that FNTIC waived this condition by denying coverage, citing the United States Supreme Court’s decision styled St. Louis Dressed Beef & Provision Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 201 U.S. 173, 181 (1906).  The Dressed Beef Court found that when an underwriter is notified of an action and a defense is tendered and denied, the insured is under no obligation to provide the underwriter any further notice of the litigation or settlement thereof.  The Court distinguished Dressed Beef in that U.S. Bank never requested FNTIC's defense for Samsara’s lawsuit.  Thus, U.S. Bank's failure to notify FNTIC of the suit never triggered the duty to defend and Condition 8(c). On this basis, the Court dismissed the first two causes of action (declaratory judgment and breach of contract).

FNTIC also argued that U.S. Bank's third, fourth, and fifth claims (good faith and fair dealing, deceptive trade practices and unfair claims practices) are time-barred by the respective statute of limitations, the longest of which was four years. U.S. Bank claimed the statute was tolled due to FNTIC's duty to defend as it provided notice of the HOA Sale. The Court identified two potential periods related to the duty to defend tolling doctrine: from the HOA's foreclosure on December 2, 2013, to FNTIC's denial on October 9, 2014, and from Samsara's complaint on December 8, 2015, to the settlement on April 26, 2019. The Court then held that U.S. Bank's failure to notify FNTIC of Samsara’s lawsuit was insufficient to trigger the duty to defend. Consequently, the tolling ended on October 9, 2014 when FNTIC denied the initial claim.  The Court, therefore, dismissed the claims alleging bad faith, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of NRS § 598.0915 and § 686A.310 as time-barred, since U.S. Bank waited until 2020 to file them.

FNTIC requested the dismissal of U.S. Bank's complaint without leave to amend, arguing that U.S. Bank cannot present any facts to support a cause of action. The Court agreed, concluding that any amendment would be futile due to U.S. Bank's failure to tender defense of the lawsuit to FNTIC, a critical element in the Court's analysis.

Takeaways

This case underscores the importance of the insured actively communicating with their insurer when seeking defense coverage. The Court emphasized that proper and timely notice of any impending lawsuit is crucial for triggering the insurer's duty to defend. Failure to provide adequate notice can absolve the insurer of its obligation to defend the insured.

For a copy of the decision, please contact Michael O’Donnell at modonnell@riker.comMatthews Florez at mflorez@riker.com, Kori Pruett at kpruett@riker.com or summer associate Brianna J. Rojas, a law student at Rutgers University School of Law.

Appeals Court Clarifies Tidelands Licensee Rights and TRC’s Pierhead Line Authority

In its May 8, 2024 decision in In the Matter of P.T. Jibsail Family Limited Partnership, the Appellate Division clarified the distinction between the riparian rights under a tidelands grant versus a license and the scope of the Tidelands Resource Council’s (“TRC”) authority to fix pierhead lines.

In 2017, P.T. Jibsail Family Limited Partnership (“Jibsail”) applied for (1) a Waterfront Development (“WFD”) permit from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (“NJDEP”) and (2) a modification of a tidelands license received by its predecessor-in-interest, in order to extend its dock in Barnegat Bay. The owner of the neighboring property, the Janine Morris Trust (“JMT”) opposed the application. JMT’s property also had a dock that its predecessor had built pursuant to its own tidelands license. Jibsail received a WFD permit and a modified tidelands license to construct a 168-foot dock extension (“2018 License”). The dock was constructed in 2018, but was not in compliance with the submitted plans, which required that modifications be made to the WFD permit and Tidelands license (“2022 Modified License”). NJDEP and the TRC approved the modifications in 2019 and 2022, respectively.

JMT appealed the TRC approval of a modification of the Jibsail tidelands license. JMT argued that the TRC should not have issued the 2022 Modified License because Jibsail’s dock was outside the existing pierhead lines. JMT also argued that the TRC acted outside of its statutory authority by establishing the pierhead line in the license itself.

Notably, JMT did not appeal the 2018 License, and the time to appeal it had long since passed by the time JMT appealed the 2022 Modified License. JMT did continue to object to Jibsail’s WFD permit including requesting the permit be revoked or modified. Jibsail needed to modify its WFD permit and the unchallenged 2018 License because it built its dock extension one foot out of compliance with the submitted plans. This one-foot error and Jibsail’s application to modify its Tidelands license reopened the appeal period for a project that had been permitted and completed several years before, at least with respect to certain issues addressed in the 2018 License.

The Appellate Division affirmed the TRC’s issuance of the 2022 Modified License.  In its decision, the court distinguished the rights afforded to holders of a tidelands grant and a tidelands license. The court explained that a tidelands grant provides a fee simple interest in real property that extends the width of the upland parcel to the pierhead line. A tidelands license, on the other hand, only gives the licensee a lease of the area in the “license box” that aligns with the size of the permitted structure. Additionally, a tidelands grant provides a right to the land under the water that extends to the point where the owner has access to navigable water. Conversely, the tidelands license only provides a right to use the land in the “license box” and the licensee’s right is no stronger outside the license box than another member of the public. As such, the Appellate Division disagreed with JMT’s arguments that it had a preemptive right to the tidelands from its bulkhead to the pierhead line and it determined that JMT’s rights do not preclude the State from managing the area outside of their license box. Jibsail’s dock did not enter into JMT’s licensed area, thus the TRC’s approval was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

Additionally, the Appellate Division further clarified the TRC’s statutory authority to establish pierhead lines. JMT asserted that the pierhead line for Jibsail’s dock was beyond the pierhead line that was previously established as required by statute and the TRC acted outside of its authority in establishing a new pierhead line in Jibsail’s license. The court found that the TRC had acted within its statutory authority when approving the modification to Jibsail’s license. The court explained that the TRC’s authority in N.J.S.A. 12:3-19 directs it to “from time to time, fix and establish … exterior lines in said waters beyond which no pier, wharf, bulkhead, erection, or permanent obstruction of any kind shall be made or maintained.” Citing Schultz v. Wilson, 44 N.J. Super. 561 (App. Div. 1957), the Appellate Division determined that the TRC had acted within its authority in fixing a new pierhead line in the Jibsail 2022 Modified License by fixing a pierhead line through a license and suggested that the TRC likely had in mind that in future grants or licenses “the same exterior course could be followed.”

Parties acquiring property subject to a tidelands grant or license or considering applying for a new tidelands grant or license should be aware of the different rights each interest conveys and the limited scope of a tidelands license, as set forth in the Jibsail case.  Outside of the context of tidelands, the decision serves as a reminder that modifications to a permit could reopen the permit holder to legal challenges to issues that, in the absence of the modification, would have been settled and unappealable.

For more information, please contact the author Amelia Whiting at awhiting@riker.com or any attorney in our Environmental Practice group.

Missouri Supreme Court Reinforces Coverage Limits for Zoning Matters in Standard ALTA Policy

Introduction

In a recent case from the Supreme Court of Missouri, the Court addressed whether a title company’s actual knowledge of an existing lawsuit against buyers of real property  (“Buyers”) could defeat the plain language of Covered Risk 5 and Exclusion 1(a) of the standard ALTA title insurance policy (the “Policy”) that otherwise would have precluded coverage of the defense of a lawsuit. Sachtleben v. Alliant Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 687 S.W.3d 624 (2024). The Court ultimately relied on the Policy’s plain language to reject the Buyers’ various arguments and affirm the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in the title company’s favor.

Background

On September 28, 2016, the Buyers purchased approximately 20 acres of land in the city of New Melle, Missouri. The land was largely unimproved, except for a barn. On August 29, 2016, prior to the sale of the property, New Melle sued the sellers of the property (“Sellers”) to enjoin the Sellers from using the barn for any other purpose other than a single family residence as that was all the applicable zoning code allowed for. In October 2016, New Melle added the Buyers as defendants based on their new ownership of the property.

Before closing, Buyers engaged a title agent, Investors Title Company (“ITC”), to obtain a title insurance policy from Alliant National Title Insurance Co. (“Alliant”). ITC prepared a title commitment for Alliant which identified the aforementioned law suit as a potential “special exception” from coverage. However, when Alliant ultimately issued the insurance policy to Buyers, the policy did not identify or otherwise reference the New Melle lawsuit.

Buyers alleged that they were not provided a copy of the title commitment, nor were they otherwise informed of the New Melle lawsuit by ITC, Alliant, or the Sellers. Indeed, Buyers asserted that they only discovered the existence of the suit when they were added as defendants. Buyers demanded that Alliant provide coverage for the New Melle zoning case, but Alliant denied coverage as the Policy only covered zoning violations if they were recorded in the Public Records under the plain meaning of Exclusion 1(a) and Covered Risk 5, and the lawsuit was not. Exclusion 1(a) of the Policy excluded coverage for zoning violations unless addressed in Covered Risk 5, which provided coverage if the violation was recorded in the aforementioned Public Records. The Public Records in the Policy were defined as “Records established under state statutes at the Date of the Policy for the purposes of imparting constructive notice of matters relating to real property to purchasers for value without Knowledge [defined policy term to mean actual knowledge].”

On March 25, 2021, the Missouri circuit court entered judgment in New Melle’s favor in that case.

On May 13, 2021, Buyers sued Alliant, ITC, and others. With respect to Alliant, Buyers alleged that it breached the insurance policy by refusing to defend against the New Melle lawsuit. Alliant successfully moved for summary judgment, asserting that no provision of the policy provided coverage to the Buyers. Buyers appealed.

Appeal

On appeal, the Buyers argued that Alliant should have provided defense of the New Melle case because it had actual knowledge of the lawsuit from the title commitment, and the lawsuit constituted a public notice of a violation of a city ordinance concerning use and enjoyment of the land, which was covered by the policy. The Buyers asserted that to find no coverage would create an “absurd loophole” that allowed for the title company to decline coverage for an issue it was aware of simply because the notice of the issue had not been properly recorded with a recorder of deeds.

The Missouri Supreme Court rejected the Buyers’ arguments, and stated that it was bound to enforce the Policy as it was written. In that regard, Covered Risk 5 of the Policy provided for coverage for zoning violations only “if a notice, describing any part of the Land, is recorded in the Public Records setting forth the violation or intention to enforce, but only to the extent of the violation or enforcement referred to in that notice.” In other words, the policy provided that recorded notice was required for coverage. However, it was undisputed that county land records contained no document describing the property nor identifying that any ordinance violation existed. Therefore, the Court found that the specific provision did not provide for coverage of the New Melle lawsuit.

In doing so, the Court similarly rejected the Buyers’ argument that the policy’s definition of “Public Records” was ambiguous and that “Public Records” must include court records. Once again relying on the plain language of the policy, the Court held that the policy’s definition of “Public Records” limited it to those records established by statute to impart constructive notice to purchasers of real property, and therefore excluded court records.

Finally, the Court rejected Buyers’ remaining arguments for coverage under Covered Risks 2 and 3 relating to defects in title and marketability based on Exclusion 1(a).  That exclusion provides that:

The following matters are expressly excluded from coverage of this policy . . . (a) any law, ordinance, permit, or governmental regulation (including those related to buildings and zoning) restricting, regulating, prohibiting, or relating to

  • The occupancy, use, and enjoyment of the Land;
  • The character, dimensions, or location of any improvement erected on the Land;
  • The subdivision of land;
  • Environmental protection.

Thus, the Court held that the Policy was unambiguous and the plain meaning of Exclusion 1(a) and Covered Risk 5 controlled despite the title insurer’s actual knowledge of the lawsuit.

Takeaway

This case reinforces the well-established maxim of contract interpretation that the language of a clear and unambiguous insurance policy will be afforded its plain meaning with particular regard to the critical provisions of coverage for zoning violations in the standard title policy: Covered Risk 5 and Exclusion 1(a). Insureds, who want more coverage for zoning issues, would be well advised to consider the zoning endorsement offered by underwriters.

For a copy of the decision, please contact Michael O’Donnell at modonnell@riker.com, Matthews Florez at mflorez@riker.com, or Kori Pruett at kpruett@riker.com.

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