What You Need to Know

• Adverse possession requires 30 years of continuous use in New Jersey - The court affirmed that a party can acquire legal ownership of disputed property through adverse possession by demonstrating 30 years of actual, uninterrupted possession that is hostile, visible, open and notorious, and continuous. The defendant successfully proved all elements through testimony showing they had used the strip for parking for over 30 years.
• Actual and inquiry notice can defeat property claims even with a recorded deed - Despite the plaintiff having a recorded deed that included the disputed strip, the court found the plaintiff had both actual knowledge (from observing the defendant's use before purchase) and inquiry notice (from survey uncertainties, a 19-year recording discrepancy, and title policy exclusions) of potential title problems. The plaintiff's failure to investigate further proved fatal to their claim.
• Inconsistencies in the chain of title matter significantly – This case demonstrates the importance of carefully examining the complete chain of title. The strip appeared and disappeared in various deeds over the years, with a critical 1967 subdivision that was never properly recorded. Between 1974 and 1990, only deeds in Lot 3's chain of title (the defendant's property) included the strip, which supported the defendant's claim despite the strip later reappearing in the plaintiff's 1990 deed.
• Equitable considerations favor parties with long-term possession and maintenance - When legal title is uncertain, courts will apply equitable principles and may award ownership to the party who has actually occupied, used, and maintained the property for an extended period, especially when the other party had notice of the possession before purchasing.

Introduction

In a July 9, 2025 Opinion, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed a trial court’s decision awarding ownership of a disputed strip of land between two commercial properties where the defendant had occupied the land for more than 30 years, and the plaintiff had both actual and inquiry notice of defendant’s possession.  Sule v. Codiroli Family Enters., LP, 2025 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1254 (App. Div. July 9, 2025).

Facts

Plaintiff Akos Sule (“Plaintiff”) purchased a commercial property (the “Property” or “Lot 4”) from Graco, Inc. in 1991. The Property is adjacent to Lot 3, another commercial property, and there is a narrow strip located along the shared lot line (the “Strip”). The Strip consists of an area with curbing and asphalt with parking spaces and a grassy area.

Plaintiff’s 1991 deed was recorded in the Essex County Register’s Office. Prior to purchase, Plaintiff had the Property surveyed, and the survey’s results were consistent with the deed’s legal description. The deed designated the Strip as part of “Tract II” on the Property. The Codirolis purchased Lot 3 in 1999, and later transferred title to Codiroli Family Enterprises, L.P. (“Defendant”), with a properly-recorded deed. The Strip also appears in Defendant’s deed.

Most of the land comprising Lot 4 and Lot 3 were previously owned by the Hrubecs. In 1956, the Hrubecs conveyed land, which included Lot 3, to the Malangas, by recorded deed. That deed did not include the Strip. In 1966, the Hrubecs conveyed land, including Lot 4 and a majority of the Strip, to Graco Sales via recorded deed. In 1966, the Pio Costas conveyed the rest of Lot 4, and the rest of the Strip, to Graco Sales. In 1967, Graco Sales apparently arranged with its neighbor at the time, Mal-Bros. Contracting (“Mal-Bros”), to subdivide Lot 4 to create the Strip and deed it to Mal-Bros, in exchange for an equal-sized parcel of land adjacent to Lot 4 (the “Bump”). There was no documentation of this transaction, other than a June 1967 subdivision map, identifying the land “corresponding to the Strip as land ‘to be subtracted from Lot 1 [now part of Lot 4] and added to Lot 1-A [now Lot 3]’ and as land ‘to be subtracted from Lot 2H [the rest of Lot 4] and added to Lot 1-A [now Lot 3].’”  The document also indicates that the parcel known as the Bump was "to be added to Lot 1 [now Lot 4].” The planning board and mayor of the town signed and approved the subdivision, but there was no record evidence of its recording.

In Defendant’s chain of title for Lot 3, the Strip appeared in a 1971 deed, and excludes the Bump. From that deed until the present, Lot 3’s chain of title includes the Strip. Consistent with the 1971 Lot 3 deed, Graco Sales’ conveyance of Lot 4 to Graco, Inc. included the Bump, but not the Strip in a 1971 deed recorded in 1974. However, in 1990, a year before Plaintiff purchased Lot 4, the Strip reappeared in a deed that was recorded, conveying Lot 4 as of May 12, 1972. Nonetheless, from 1974 to 1990, the only recorded deeds involving the ownership of the Strip were in Lot 3’s chain of title.

In 2022, Plaintiff brought this action to quiet title as to the Strip and for compensation of the use of the Strip since 1991. After a three-day bench trial where both parties presented expert testimony and witnesses, the trial court ruled in favor of Defendant, finding that: (1) Plaintiff had actual and inquiry notice of the Strip’s potential title problem, and Defendant is equitably entitled to its use, since it had been using and maintaining the Strip for more than thirty years; and (2) Defendant obtained the Strip through adverse possession.  Plaintiff subsequently appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in his factual findings and misapplied laws regarding the ownership of property based on the recorded deeds and adverse possession.

Decision

On appeal, the Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s witness credibility findings, as the findings were supported by competent, credible evidence. Plaintiff challenged the weight of Defendant’s expert testimony on the ground that the expert improperly communicated with defense counsel during the trial’s overnight recess. The Court rejected Plaintiff’s argument, as it held that the Court Rule only restricts communications between a witness and their lawyer during depositions, and the Rule does not apply to consultations during overnight breaks. Further, Plaintiff failed to present any allegation that the expert altered his testimony after the overnight recess.

The Court also affirmed the trial court’s findings on Plaintiff’s actual and inquiry notice, reasoning that Plaintiff’s survey of Lot 4, conducted prior to purchase, showed uncertainty regarding the Strip. The trial testimony also showed that Plaintiff had knowledge of Defendant’s predecessors using the Strip as a parking lot prior to Plaintiff’s purchase. Moreover, the Lot 4 deed that was recorded in 1990, purporting to convey Lot 4 as of 1974, had a nineteen-year discrepancy between the date of preparation and the date of recording. Finally, Plaintiff’s title policy excluded the Strip. As such, the Court held that Plaintiff had an obligation to make further inquiry but failed to do so.

Since Plaintiff’s title to the Strip was in question, the trial court properly assessed which party had equitable title, and determined that the history of the properties and the Defendant’s usage weighed in favor of awarding the Strip to Defendant.

Finally, the Court affirmed the trial court’s finding of Defendant’s ownership by adverse possession. Under New Jersey law, a possessor may acquire title by thirty years of actual, uninterrupted possession. The possession must be adverse or hostile, visible, open and notorious, and continuous. Here, the trial court ruled that Defendant proved all four elements, as trial testimony showed that Defendant or its predecessors used the Strip for parking for more than thirty years, and even Plaintiff testified that Defendant’s use extended beyond thirty years.

As such, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, declaring Defendant the owner of the Strip.

Takeaways

This case is an excellent primer on chains of title and adverse possession principles.

For a copy of the decision, please contact Michael O’Donnell at modonnell@riker.com or Keshav Agiwal at kagiwal@riker.com.