Search Icon
Mass. Appeals Court Upholds Joint Tenancy Reformation Based on Parties’ Intent Banner Image

Mass. Appeals Court Upholds Joint Tenancy Reformation Based on Parties’ Intent

Month: February 2024

Mass. Appeals Court Upholds Joint Tenancy Reformation Based on Parties’ Intent

Posted on by Christie Bowness

Introduction

The Appeals Court of Massachusetts recently affirmed a summary judgment decision in favor of a property owner regarding the validity of a joint tenancy created between a married couple and a mother, that later may have been inadvertently terminated as part of divorce proceedings.  See Pillai v. Scalia, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 1122 (2024).

Background

Gregory Bohenko (“Gregory”), Christine Bohenko (“Christine”), and Christine’s mother Priscilla Scalia (“Priscilla”) acquired title to property located in Westford, MA (the “Property”) in 1993, taking title “as joint tenants,” as was handwritten in the margin of the deed (the “1993 Deed”).  Christine and Gregory later divorced, and as part of their divorce settlement, Gregory deeded “all [his] right, title and interest in and to the Property” to Christine in 2002 (the “2002 Deed”).  Priscilla died in 2012, leaving a will that left her interest in the Property to her children (who were the defendants of this action), “but only if [she] ha[d] an interest in that property at the time of [her] passing.”  In 2018, Christine sold the Property to Plaintiff and swore in an affidavit that she believed that she was the sole owner of the Property upon her mother’s death by operation of the joint tenancy.  When Plaintiff attempted to refinance her mortgage, an attorney for the lender notified her of a possible title defect stemming from the 2002 deed from Gregory to Christine.  As such, Plaintiff brought a quiet title action.

The Trial Court

Plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment.  In granting the motion, the trial court judge determined that the plain language of the 1993 Deed created a joint tenancy among Christine, Gregory, and Priscilla. He determined further that, while the 2002 Deed terminated the joint tenancy, there was no genuine dispute that Christine and Gregory intended for the joint tenancy between Christine and Priscilla to remain intact, and as such, ordered that the 2002 Deed be reformed to identify the grantees as Christine and Priscilla “as joint tenants.”  Finally, the judge concluded that the plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser.  Defendants appealed.

The Appeal

The Appellate Court upheld the trial court on all counts.  With regard to the 1993 deed, the Court agreed that the conveyance to “‘PRISCILLA SCALIA, CHRISTINE BOHENKO AND GREGORY BOHENKO, as joint tenants’ – ‘clearly express [ed] an intent to create a joint tenancy’” as to all three of them.  The Court rejected Defendant’s assertion that the location of the phrase “as joint tenants” in the right margin of the deed changed the plain import of those words.

Regarding the 2002 Deed, the Court questioned whether the trial court was correct in determining that the conveyance from Gregory to Christine terminated the joint tenancy, citing case law that suggests that where there are more than two joint tenants, a conveyance by one tenant does not affect the joint tenancy among the remaining tenants.  Citing, e.g., Foster v. Smith, 211 Mass. 497, 503 (1912) (“a conveyance by one of three joint tenants of his interest does not affect the joint tenancy of the other two”).  However, the Court determined that it need not determine whether the trial court was correct on this issue because even assuming that the 2002 Deed severed the joint tenancy between Christine and Priscilla, the defendants had not shown that the judge erred in reforming the deed, a remedy which the Court stated is “available to correct language in an instrument that does ‘not reflect [the parties’] true intent” where the party requesting it can “prove a mutual mistake or a mistake by one party known to the other.”  The Court found this was the case, as the record contained no evidence that Gregory or Christine intended to sever the joint tenancy between Christine and Priscilla. In fact, the only evidence was an affidavit from Christine stating that the 2002 Deed was not intended to change Christine and Priscilla’s joint tenancy.  The Court also determined that Defendants had offered no proof as to its contentions that Plaintiff was required to prove that Priscilla intended to maintain the joint tenancy in the 2002 deed (since she was not a party to it) and that deeds may only be reformed to fix technical mistakes.

Finally, the Court held that Plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser for value.  The Court rejected Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff was on constructive notice of a title issue stemming from the 2002 Deed since the title searches she obtained as part of her purchase and subsequent refinancing of the Property uncovered no defects.  As such, the Court upheld summary judgment on all counts.

Takeaways

Despite the seeming agreement of the parties, the appellate court gave a clear signal that, in its view, the termination of a joint tenancy between two tenants where there are three or more total tenants does not necessarily extinguish the joint tenancy among all joint tenants.  Moreover, the Court made clear that even if such an act did extinguish the joint tenancy, it would look to the surrounding circumstances to re-establish the joint tenancy where the parties’ intent dictated.

For a copy of the decision, please contact Michael O’Donnell at modonnell@riker.com, Thomas Persico at tpersico@riker.com, Kevin Hakansson at khakansson@riker.com, or Kori Pruett at kpruett@riker.com.

California Appeals Court Upholds Dismissal of Negligence Claims Against Title Insurer/Escrow Agent

Posted on by Jessica Civetta

Introduction

The California Court of Appeals, First Appellate District, Division Five recently upheld demurrer in favor of a title insurer, who also served as escrow agent in connection with the sale of property in Alameda County, dismissing negligence and contract claims as the plaintiff was not a third party beneficiary of either the title policy or escrow agreement. See Christensen v. First Am. Title Co., No. A166796, 2024 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 489 (Jan. 25, 2024).

The case involved a .26 acre parcel of land containing a single-family residence (the “Property”) that was purchased by Oscar and Nancy Hanawai Goodman (the “Goodmans”) in 1992. In 1994, the Goodmans purchased a portion of the adjoining lot (the “Addition”) in order to extend their property line further south. The 1994 deed identifies both the Property and the Addition together, approximately 0.319 acres (the “Expanded Property”), but the Goodmans did not obtain an official lot line adjustment to reflect an expanded parcel. After transferring the Property and Expanded Property to a trust (the “Trust”) by two deeds in the year 2000, the Trust sold the Property – but not the Expanded Property – to Benjamin and Gabrielle Blair (the “Blairs”) in 2013. The Blairs thereafter sold the Property – but, again, not the Expanded Property – to Plaintiffs in 2019, though Plaintiffs claimed that the Blairs and their real estate agents represented that the sale was for the Expanded Property. First American Title Insurance Company (“First American”) was the escrow agent and title insurer for the Blairs' 2013 purchase of the Property from the Trust and for Plaintiffs' 2019 purchase of the Property. Plaintiffs alleged that First American knew there were two deeds from the Goodmans to the Trust because of its role in the 2013 purchase, and brought claims of negligence against First American for its roles in the 2013 and 2019 sales and breach of contract regarding the 2013 sale.

The Trial Court
First American filed a demurrer as to all claims against it. As to the negligence claim based on the 2019 sale, First American argued the duties it owed were limited and it could not have effected a transfer of the Expanded Property because the Blairs owned only the Property. With respect to the negligence claim based on the 2013 sale, First American argued escrow agents do not owe duties to third parties. As to the contract claim, First American argued Plaintiffs were not the intended third party beneficiaries of the 2013 contract. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and issued judgment in favor of First American.

Claims Related to the 2013 Sale
Plaintiffs argued that First American owed them a duty of care regarding the transfer of Property from the Trust to the Blairs because that transaction was “intended to benefit ‘Plaintiffs and all future owners of the Subject Property because it was the first time the original parcel and the [Addition] should have been officially joined by a lot line adjustment.’” Quoting Summit Financial Holdings, Ltd. v. Continental Lawyers Title Co., 27 Cal.4th 705 (2002), the Court stated that “[t]he determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of various factors, among which are the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm.” While the Court agreed with Plaintiffs that their injury was “certain,” it found that future owners of property are “collateral” to the primary purpose of a sale of property. It found further that Plaintiffs’ allegations did not support foreseeability because there are no factual allegations showing First American could have foreseen that the Blairs would allegedly misrepresent the property they owned when selling it to future buyers and that the real estate agents involved in the future sale would not catch or correct the misrepresentation. The Court also determined that the “closeness” element did not support a finding of negligence, as the connection between Plaintiffs’ injury and First American's conduct in the 2013 sale transaction is attenuated because the more immediate cause was the alleged misrepresentation by the Blairs and the real estate agents in the 2019 sale. The Court found that First American did not bear any “moral blame” because it did not “act fraudulently, illegally, or with any intent to cause anyone disadvantage.” Finally, the Court found that the situation did not implicate a policy against preventing future harm, since escrow companies already had duties to perform which could give rise to actions for breach of contract for damages. For these reasons, the Court upheld demurrer of the negligence claim.

As to Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim, the Court noted that a third party could bring suit only when certain criteria are met, including “whether a motivating purpose of the contracting parties was to provide a benefit to the third party.” The Court found that this was not the case in the 2013 transaction, as there was no indication that the parties to the 2013 transaction had a “motivating purpose” to benefit Plaintiffs, consistent with the concept that providing a benefit to subsequent purchasers of real property is “ordinarily not among the motivating purposes of a contract for escrow and title insurance services.” As such, the Court upheld demurrer of the breach of contract claim.

Claims Related to the 2019 Sale
Regarding the negligence claim pertaining to the 2019 sale to Plaintiffs, the Court upheld demurrer for First American. The Court found that First American owed no duty of care in its capacity as title insurer, as Plaintiffs’ relationship with First American was purely contractual. In its capacity as escrow agent, Plaintiffs argued First American owed them a duty of care as an escrow agent “to identify and include the correct legal description in the grant deeds.” After pointing out that “an escrow holder’s obligations are limited to compliance with the parties’ instructions,” the Court held that First American had done just that – the Blairs transferred the Plaintiffs’ title to the Property only, and because the transfer to Plaintiffs could not include property the Blairs did not own, First American had verified the proper description of the Property, which was the property being transferred by the Blairs. While Plaintiffs raised theories of adverse possession of mutual mistake in the 2013 deed, they provided no authority that the Blairs could transfer the Expanded Property based on such theories absent a legal proceeding to quiet title or for reformation of the 2013 grant deed.

Takeaways
The takeaways from this case include that (1) Courts will impose a high threshold to find a title insurer and escrow agent negligent in matters of negligence asserted by third parties who are attenuated from the subject transaction; and (2) similarly, where a third-party beneficiary asserts a breach of contract claim against a title insurer based on a transaction it was not party to, Courts will require that the parties to the contract entered into the contract with a “motivating purpose” to benefit future owners, not normally the case with standard real-estate transactions.

For a copy of the decision, please contact Michael O’Donnell at modonnell@riker.com, Thomas Persico at tpersico@riker.com, Kevin Hakansson at khakansson@riker.com, or Kori Pruett at kpruett@riker.com.

NJ Appeals Court Finds Title Agency Misclassified Employees as Independent Contractors

Posted on by Christie Bowness

In a decision issued on January 31, 2024, the New Jersey Appellate Division analyzed whether the level of control exercised by a title agent over closers, notaries, and title abstractors rendered them independent contractors or employees for the purposes of contributions under the New Jersey Unemployment Compensation Law and upheld the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Labor’s determination that the workers were employees, not independent contractors pursuant to the UCL.  Your Hometown Title, LLC v. N.J. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Dev., No. A-1168-21, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 148 (App. Div. Jan. 31, 2024). This decision is of note to title agents and requires a careful review of their vendor agreements

The Department of Labor Decision

The Department of Labor (“DOL”) initiated an investigation into Your Hometown Title, LLC (“YHT”) to ascertain whether YHT had tendered the required contributions to the unemployment compensation and state disability benefit funds in accordance with the New Jersey Unemployment Compensation Law (“UCL”). The DOL determined that twelve of the individuals YHT had classified as independent contractors were in fact employees under the law, including title abstractors, notaries, closers, and a cleaner hired to clean the YHT facility.

YHT appealed the decision to the Office of Administrative Law, where the administrative law judge found that eleven of the twelve individuals were independent contractors. Upon review of the administrative law judge’s findings, the Commissioner overruled the judge and determined that all twelve employees were “misclassified as independent contractors.”

In New Jersey, an employer’s obligation to “pay into an unemployment benefits fund under N.J.S.A. 43:21-7, turns on whether its workers are employees or independent contractors.”   Pursuant to the UCL, a court uses a specific test, commonly called the ABC test, to determine whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor. N.J.S.A. 43:21-19(i)(6)(A)-(C): (A) the individual must be “free from control or direction over the performance of such service”; (B) the service “is either outside the usual course of the business for which such service is performed” or the service is performed outside the regular place of business for that service; and (C) the individual “is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business.”

As to prong A, the Commissioner relied on YHT’s “Independent Vendor Services Agreement,” “Vendor Services Agreement,” “Witness Only Closer Instructions,” and “Notary Signing Agent Code of Conduct” (collectively the “YHT Agreements”) to find that the YHT Agreements established an employer-employee relationship because they required the workers to complete their tasks in accordance with the strict guidelines, reporting requirements, and time restraints set for by YHT. The Commissioner noted that the YHT Agreements “reflect a ‘substantial degree of control’ over the individual engaged with YHT.” The Commissioner pointedly rejected YHT’s contention that the instructions set forth in the YHTS Agreements are “simply industry ‘best practices.’” He reasoned that YHT’s decision to issue the YHT Agreements, even if the requirements are industry best practices, “at YHT’s sole discretion without any input from the closers, notaries, or title abstractors, coupled with the substantive provisions in these documents, is the ‘very essence of direction and control.’”

The Commissioner further determined that YHT had failed to establish prong B as to closers and notary signing agents because they provide services at closing, which is a service performed by YHT in its “usual course of business” and the location of the closing “are locations whether YHT performs ‘an integral part of its business.’”  In contrast, the Commissioner found that YHT satisfied prong B as to title abstractors because he determined that categorizing the County Clerk’s office as YHT’s place of business was “unfair.”

Finally, as to prong C, the Commissioner held that YHT met its burden for eleven of the twelve workers. Specifically, he determined that the closers, notaries, and title abstractors had their own “legitimate independent business enterprises” and “only earned between one and twenty-eight percent of their Schedule C income” from YHT assignments. The one exception to the Commissioner’s finding was an employee who earned eighty-eight percent of her Schedule C income from YHT. YHT appealed the Commissioner’s finding.

The Appeal

On appeal, YHT argued that it satisfied the ABC test and the facts at issue are like the facts set forth in Trauma Nurses, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of Labor, 242 N.J. Super. 135, 147 (App. Div. 1990), because the individuals could choose whether to accept an assignment, had no “material ‘direction and supervision,’” and “had autonomy.” YHT reiterated its contention that the YHT Agreements “simply reiterate industry standards” and asserted that because the individuals are required to maintain their own insurance, they “operate a separate business.” As to prong B, YHT claimed that the disputed work occurs outside its place of business, and it does not provide closing and abstracting title services “to the public but hires vendors to perform” the services, rendering them outside YHT’s usual course of business. Turning to prong C, YHT asserted that it was the individual’s choice to procure the majority of her work from YHT.

The New Jersey Land Title Association (“NJLTA”) participated in the appeal as amicus curiae. NJLTA argued that the Commissioner’s decision lacked factual support, that “industry standards and codes of conduct are not the same as instructions” and the title agent does not control the timeline of the transactions; the buyer and seller of the property do. Critically, NJLTA asserted that the status of the workers as employees was “negated by virtue of the individuals carrying their own insurance.” In contrast, DOL argued that YHT required the individuals to sign agreements and “adhere to role-specific addendums[.]” DOL countered that even if the YHT Agreements “reflect industry standards in practice,” it was YHT’s decision “to adopt the instructions, thereby mandating compliance with them as a condition of providing services for YHT.”

On appeal, the Court reviewed the record below to determine whether “the Commissioner acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner or that its decision lacked fair support in the record.” Further, the Court reiterated that the findings of the assignment law judge “are not binding on the Commissioner.” After reviewing the record and relevant controlling law, the Court held that the Commissioner’s determination was reasonable.

Specifically, the Court found that YHT had failed to meet prong A and “the Commissioner reasonably classified the closers, notary signing agents, and title abstractors as employees of YHT” because they “were subject to a sufficient degree of control[.]” Like the Commissioner, the Court looked to the YHT Agreements and noted that YHT’s “instructions for the title abstractors were detailed in nature” and “specific directions” were provided for a range of tasks, which had “to be completed in strict compliance” with the YHT Agreements. Rejecting YHT and NJLTA’s assertion that the YHT Agreements simply set forth industry standards, the court determined that the agreements were “specific vendor services agreement[s]” with detailed requirements set by YHT, “not an outside institution.” Finding that YHT had failed to satisfy prong A, the court declined to substantively address the remaining prongs of the ABC test.

In sum, the Court upheld the Commissioner’s finding that closers, notaries, and title abstractors were employees for purposes of contributions under the UCL due to the specific “instructions and parameters” set forth in the YHT Agreements. Although focused on the UCL, this decision calls into question the nature of the relationship between title agents and the parties they contract with to do closings and title searches, including whether that relationship is susceptible to additional liabilities based on the language of the constraints and requirements set forth in the vendor agreements. Thus, those agreements should be carefully reviewed to be clear on a vendor’s status and responsibilities.

The Community Wealth Preservation Program: A Guide for Lenders and Homeowners

Posted on by Christie Bowness

Introduction

On January 12, 2024, Governor Murphy signed legislation establishing the “Community Wealth Preservation Program,” which aims to make it easier for homeowners in residential foreclosure actions, along with their families, “their next of kin, tenants, and other prospective owner-occupants” to purchase a foreclosed-upon property. P.L.2023, c.255. The Community Wealth Preservation Program ("CWPP") took effect immediately upon signature and grants a foreclosed-upon defendant additional time to buy back the home and special financing opportunities, creating potential consequences for financial service organizations in New Jersey. The version of the law as signed was significantly improved from the original legislation that had been conditionally vetoed by the Governor in 2022, particularly with the removal of the language that would have required a 50% write down by financial institutions.

Because of the increased time allowed for the foreclosed-upon defendant to buy back the home and the special financing implemented in this law, there are various considerations for financial service organizations in New Jersey for properties that reach sheriff’s sale.

The CWPP Law

The Community Wealth Preservation Program amends N.J.S.A. 2A:50-64 -- a section of the 1995 New Jersey Fair Foreclosure Act ("FFA" Procedures for sale) and N.J.S.A. 22A:4-8 (Fees and mileage of sheriffs and other officers) and attempts to make it easier for those with ties to a foreclosed-upon property to remain in possession of that property. It also created a new section which provides immunity to a creditor or its agent who is responsible for the care, maintenance, security, and upkeep of the property if it becomes vacant and abandoned, to peacefully enter the property and exercise reasonable care in doing so. It clarifies that any persons bidding on the property are not permitted to enter the property prior to the sheriff's sale.

The new law has a few key elements:

Right of first refusal ("ROFR"): The law gives the foreclosed-upon individual(s) of a residential property, the next of kin, or a tenant of the property the first right of refusal to purchase the property for the original upset price or at the final starting upset price, whichever is less. This right survives even if there is a delay, whereby the foreclosed-upon defendant will retain the first right of refusal until the rescheduled date of sale.

The upset price is the “minimum amount that a foreclosed-upon property shall be sold for in a sheriff’s sale as determined by the foreclosing plaintiff.” It must be posted online at least four weeks before the sale. The upset price also must not increase by more than 3 percent from the price initially listed online or in a mailed notice. The foreclosing plaintiff is prohibited from contacting the foreclosed-upon defendant, next of kin, or nonprofit community center to ask if they will participate in the sheriff’s sale. The foreclosing plaintiff must also disclose whether the property is vacant, tenant-occupied, or owner-occupied before the sale. The successful bidder must also be granted access to the property if it is vacant and the lender has the capability to grant access.

To exercise the right of first refusal, the individual must intend to live in the residence for at least 84 months and put 3.5 percent of the upset price down as a deposit, with the remainder due within 90 business days. Additionally, a tenant or successful bidder who finances the purchase of the property shall receive eight hours of homebuyer education and counseling through a United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") certified agency. If, after 90 days, the bidder fails to pay the entire balance, the bidder shall forfeit the deposit and shall be responsible for the payment of accrued interest incurred as a result of the sale being void unless the failure to close on the financing is of no fault of their own, “which includes, but is not limited to, the appraised value of the property being less than the purchase value of the property or the financial institution denying financing, in which case the bidder shall be refunded the deposit on the property and shall be responsible only for the payment of accrued interest.”

If a bidder is not the foreclosed-upon defendant, next of kin, or nonprofit development corporation, the property deed will state that the property may not be sold for 84 months from the date of the sheriff's sale. A bidder other than the foreclosed-upon defendant, next of kin, and Nonprofit Community Development Corporation who financed the purchase of the property and did not occupy the residence for at least 84 months will be assessed a fine of $100,000 for the first violation and $500,000 thereafter. However, these fines will not be assessed against a bidder who finances the purchase in good faith, but is forced to leave the property because of the death of the bidder or the bidder’s spouse or child; disability of the bidder or the bidder’s household; divorce or legal separation; military deployment; a change in the employment of the bidder or a member of the bidder's household which results in a reduction of income or a need to move out of the state.

Financing: One may finance the purchase of residential property through a sheriff’s sale if the bidder provides proof that they have been pre-approved by a financial institution regulated by the Department of Banking and Insurance of the federal asking agency. To move forward with the purchase of residential property through financing, the bidder must be preapproved from the amount of the original upset price listed in the notice or the final starting price, whichever is less; not submit bids higher than the amount the bidder has been pre-approved for; and must provide valid photo identification matching the pre-approved financing forms.

Nonprofit community development corporation ("NCDC"): The right of second refusal is given to a nonprofit community development corporation that has a written agreement with a foreclosed-upon defendant, next of kin, or tenant agreeing to allow the foreclosed-upon individual(s) to reside in the property and/or negotiate an affordable lease agreement with the foreclosed-upon individual. An NCDC is a “nonprofit organization whose mission includes community revitalization through the restoration of vacant and abandoned property to create or preserve affordable housing, as indicated in the corporation’s most recent form 1023 filing provided to the United States Internal Revenue Service.” The right of second refusal may be exercised prior to the opening of bidding if the nonprofit corporation pays a 3.5 percent deposit with the remaining balance due within 90 business days via cash, certified check, or wire transfer.

Fines will be assessed against the NCDC if it does not restore as needed and sell the property to a household earning less than 120 percent below area median income or rent the property as an affordable housing unit to a household who earns no more than 100 percent below area median income if the property is vacant or abandoned. Additionally, if the foreclosed-upon defendant or a tenant occupies the residence at the time of sale, and the NCDC does not have an agreement with the individual, the NCDC shall negotiate an affordable lease schedule allowing the individual to continue to occupy the residence. The foreclosed-upon defendant or tenant has 120 days to respond to an offer made by an NCDC, or that individual will be removed.

Finally, if an NCDC purchases the residence, the NCDC “shall ensure that, in any future sale of the property pursuant to subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1) of this subsection, the property be subject to a renewable deed restriction, with the minimum number of affordability years being 30 years and with the option to renew, requiring any future property owner to sell the property to a household earning no more than 120 percent below area median income or rent the property as an affordable housing unit to a household who earns no more than 100 percent below area median income.”

Interest deferral: No interest shall accrue on the balance of the sale of the property until 60 business days have passed following the date of the sale. The bidder will then have 30 business days to fulfill the balance. If a bidder misses this timeline, the bidder will forfeit the deposit on the property and shall be responsible for the payment of accrued interest incurred.

Notice: The law has been amended to require that a Notice of a Sheriff's Sale be sent to the foreclosed-upon residential property and to the primary address of the foreclosed-upon defendant. The new amendments also specify that the exterior of the letter giving notice of the sheriff’s sale must state that it is notice pursuant to the sale, and this language must comply with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p

Fees: When a sale is made at a sheriff’s sale, the Sheriff can now charge 10 percent in fees on sums not exceeding $5,000 and 5 percent on sums exceeding that amount. A minimum fee of $150 will also be charged for any executed sale. If the lender is the winning bidder, the fee will also be $150.

You can read the new amendment to the existing statutes here.

Get Our Latest Insights

Subscribe